Skip to main content

Citation

Gray, Kurt; MacCormack, Jennifer K.; Henry, Teague; Banks, Emmie; Schein, Chelsea; Armstrong-Carter, Emma L.; Abrams, Samantha; & Muscatell, Keely A. (2022). The Affective Harm Account (AHA) of Moral Judgment: Reconciling Cognition and Affect, Dyadic Morality and Disgust, Harm and Purity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 123(6).

Abstract

Moral psychology has long debated whether moral judgment is rooted in harm versus affect. We reconcile this debate with the affective harm account (AHA) of moral judgment. The AHA understands harm as an intuitive perception (i.e., perceived harm), and divides "affect" into two: embodied visceral arousal (i.e., gut feelings) and stimulus-directed affective appraisals (e.g., ratings of disgustingness). The AHA was tested in a randomized, double-blind pharmacological experiment with healthy young adults judging the immorality, harmfulness, and disgustingness of everyday moral scenarios (e.g., lying) and unusual purity scenarios (e.g., sex with a corpse) after receiving either a placebo or the

URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000310

Reference Type

Journal Article

Year Published

2022

Journal Title

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Author(s)

Gray, Kurt
MacCormack, Jennifer K.
Henry, Teague
Banks, Emmie
Schein, Chelsea
Armstrong-Carter, Emma L.
Abrams, Samantha
Muscatell, Keely A.

Article Type

Regular

Continent/Country

United States of America

State

North Carolina

ORCiD

Muscatell - 0000-0002-7893-5565